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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the behavior of selfish transmitters un-
der imperfect location information. The scenario consid-
ered is that of a wireless network consisting of selfish nodes
that are randomly distributed over the network domain ac-
cording to a known probability distribution, and that are
interested in communicating with a common sink node us-
ing common radio resources. In this scenario, the wireless
nodes do not know the exact locations of their competitors
but rather have belief distributions about these locations.
Firstly, properties of the packet success probability curve as
a function of the node-sink separation are obtained for such
networks. Secondly, a monotonicity property for the best-
response strategies of selfish nodes is identified. That is, for
any given strategies of competitors of a node, there exists a
critical node-sink separation for this node such that its best-
response is to transmit when its distance to the sink node
is smaller than this critical threshold, and to back off other-
wise. Finally, necessary and sufficient conditions for a given
strategy profile to be a Nash equilibrium are provided.
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C.2 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Network
Architecture and Design—Wireless communication
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Game theory, Economics, Design, Performance
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background and Motivation
The design of effective, distributed and scalable protocols
is complicated when the application environment is hostile.
If we allow for the possibility of nodes being captured and
modified by malicious agents, the design problem is partic-
ularly difficult. One way of dealing with these issues and
to have a sense of what kind of network behavior arises is
to invest all the decision-making burden in individual net-
work nodes. Nodes selfishly decide what to do by sensing
their local environment with the aim of maximizing their
own utilities. Such an approach by its very nature results in
distributed and scalable network control and management.
Game theory provides the necessary mathematical tools to
analyze the emergent behavior of networks of such selfish
agents. For this reason, game theory will lie at the heart of
design methodologies for next-generation complex and self-
organizing wireless networks.
In this paper, we consider a network of wireless selfish
nodes trying to independently maximize their utility func-
tions. We assume that these selfish nodes are willing to com-
municate with a sink node, and are randomly distributed
over the network domain according to a known probability
distribution. As opposed to much of the existing game the-
oretic work in the context of wireless networking (e.g., [1],
[2] and [3]), we do not assume perfect information about
locations of wireless nodes. The first motivating reason for
imperfect location information is that distributing node lo-
cation information to all network nodes is a prohibitive task
in wireless networks containing large numbers of nodes. The
second motivating reason is that malicious nodes tend to re-
port false location information. Therefore, it becomes im-
perative to understand the behavior of selfish nodes under
imperfect location information about others.
To this end, we assume that node locations are determined
by nature according to a spatial point process. The distribu-
tion of this point process is known by all nodes, but a node
remains unsure of the exact realizations of its opponents’
locations. Hence, each node tries to maximize its expected
utility by taking uncertainties about other nodes’ locations
into account. Our results can be summarized as follows. Let
N be the set of all nodes wishing to communicate with a
sink node. For any given strategy profile s−i = (sj)j∈N−{i}
of other nodes, we prove that packet success probability of
node i is a non-increasing continuous function of its dis-
tance to the sink node. This property enables us to prove a
monotonicity property of best-response strategies of nodes.
In particular, we show that for any given strategy profile
s−i = (sj)j∈N−{i} of other nodes, there exists a critical
threshold d∗i of node i such that node i’s best-response strat-
egy is to transmit when its distance to the sink is smaller
than d∗i , and to back off otherwise. We finally give necessary
and sufficient conditions for a strategy profile to be a Nash
equilibrium strategy profile.
1.2 Related Work
Recently, there has been intensified research interest in the
game theoretic modeling of wireless networks at the pro-
tocol level; see e.g., [1], [2] and [3]. This line of research
is mostly motivated by practical considerations revolving
around the design, deployment, control and management of
complex wireless networks of the near future. Designing a
wireless network containing a large number of nodes imposes
challenging tasks like proposing scalable network protocols
and algorithms, and making sure that every node runs them
without any deviation.
In [1] and [4], the authors model slotted ALOHA with
multi-packet reception in the presence of selfish users by us-
ing repeated games. They consider only the homogeneous
case where all nodes are identical, and prove the existence
of a symmetric Nash equilibrium. The paper [2] addresses
the selfish behavior in the CSMA/CA MAC protocol. The
authors of [2] derive the conditions for the optimal func-
tioning of the selfish transmitters in CSMA/CA. They also
propose an algorithm that guides selfish nodes to a Pareto-
efficient Nash equilibrium. In [3] and [5], a one-shot random
access game for wireless networks is introduced, and an in-
depth analysis of the channel throughput at Nash equilibria
is given. The authors also provide a detailed analysis of the
asymptotic properties of the game as the number of selfish
transmitters increases without bound.
In all of the above work, the common assumption is that
every player of the game knows the state (e.g., positions) of
other players perfectly. In contrast to them, we take a differ-
ent approach in this paper. Our selfish nodes are randomly
distributed over the network domain, and do not know the
exact positions of their opponents. Only the probability
distribution according to which node locations are drawn is
known and common information to all nodes. Selfish nodes
maximize their expected utilities by taking uncertainties in
node locations into account. This work analyzes the behav-
ior of such selfish nodes under imperfect location information
when they communicate with a common sink node.
2. NETWORK MODEL AND NODE STRATE-
GIES
2.1 Network Model
We consider a disk shaped network domain with radius
R > 0. n nodes are randomly distributed over the network
domain according to a spatial point process. We assume
that there is a common sink node located at the center of the
network domain with which all nodes wish to communicate.
This common node can be thought of as being the base
station in the context of cellular networks, or as being the
fusion center in the context of wireless sensor networks.
Figure 1: A particular realization of the network.
We let Di represent the distance of the ith node, i ∈ N =
{1, 2, · · · , n}, to the sink node. A particular realization of
Di will be represented by di. When there is no confusion, we
also sometimes denote the node-sink separation by d without
any indexes. We assume that {Di}
n
i=1 form an independent
and identically distributed set of random variables with a
common probability distribution µ. µ is common knowledge
to all nodes, and it is assumed to be an absolutely continuous
probability measure with respect to the Lebesgue measure
λ on [0, R]. We write this property as µ ≪ λ. A particular
realization of this network is depicted in Fig. 1.
We assume that a transmitted packet is successfully re-
ceived by the sink node if it is the packet received with the
highest signal power. We further assume that there is no
power control algorithm employed at the physical layer, and
all nodes transmit their data packets at the same power level.
The transmitted signal power monotonically decreases as a
function of the distance. Therefore, a packet from node i
will be successful if node i is the closest transmitting node
to the sink node.
The cost of unsuccessful transmission for node i is ci ∈
(0,∞). If a transmission is successful, the node which trans-
mitted its packet successfully receives utility 1.
2.2 Node Strategies
We define the strategy of a node as a function from all
possible values of node-sink separation to the two point set
{0, 1}, where 0 means back off and 1 means transmission.
Therefore, the strategy of a node determines whether it
transmits or backs off for any given node-sink separation.
We formally define the strategy of node i as follows.
Definition 1. A strategy of node i is a function
si : [0, R]→ {0, 1},
which determines whether to transmit or not for any given
node-sink separation d ∈ [0, R].
A strategy profile s = (s1, s2, · · · , sn) is the vector of
strategies of nodes. When we write s−i = (sj)j∈N−{i}, we
mean the strategy profile containing strategies of all nodes
except node i.
3. BEST RESPONSE STRATEGIES AND NASH
EQUILIBRIA
3.1 Properties of Packet Success Probability
We will first look at some basic properties of the packet
success probability for any given arbitrary strategy profile
s. Let Ei(d) be the event that the packet of ith transmitter
is successful when the distance between the sink node and
the ith node is d. We let
gi(d) = P (Ei(d)) . (1)
Property 1. gi(0) = 1 for any given strategy profile
s−i = (sj)j∈N−{i} of other nodes.
Proof.
gi(d) = P {∀j ∈ N − {i} : sj(Dj) = 0 or Dj > d}
=
Y
j∈N−{i}
µ {dj ∈ [0, R] : sj(dj) = 0 or dj > d}
=
Y
j∈N−{i}
µ ((d,R] ∪ {dj ∈ [0, R] : sj(dj) = 0}) .
≥ µ ((d,R])n−1 .
Since µ≪ λ, µ ((0, R]) = 1. Therefore, gi(0) = 1.
Definition 2. Given the strategy sj of node j, its subjec-
tive transmission probability (from the perspective of other
nodes) is equal to
bj = µ{dj ∈ [0, R] : sj(dj) = 1}. (2)
Since the belief distribution about the location of node j is
the same for all nodes, bj becomes the same for all of them.
In cases where different network nodes have different belief
distributions about the location of node j, its subjective
transmission probability changes from node to node.
Property 2. For any given strategy profile s−i = (sj)j∈N−{i}
of other nodes, gi(d) is a non-increasing function of d. More-
over, if there exists at least one node in N − {i} having
positive subjective transmission probability, then gi(R) < 1.
Proof. Let
qj(d) = µ ((d,R] ∪ {dj ∈ [0, R] : sj(dj) = 0}) .
Then, gi(d) =
Q
j∈N−{i} qj(d). It is easy to see that qj(d) ≥
qj(d
′) for all d′ ≥ d. Thus, gi(d) is a non-increasing function
of d. Now, assume that there exists a node j ∈ N −{i} such
that bj > 0. Then,
qj(R) = µ ({R} ∪ {dj ∈ [0, R] : sj(dj) = 0})
(a)
= µ{dj ∈ [0, R] : sj(dj) = 0}
= 1− bj
< 1,
where (a) follows from µ ≪ λ. qj(R) being smaller than 1
for some j ∈ N − {i} also implies that gi(R) < 1.
Property 3. Consider an interval (a, b) ⊆ [0, R], and let
s−i = (sj)j∈N−{i} be the strategy profile of other nodes.
• If sj = 0 on (a, b) for all j ∈ N − {i}, then gi is
constant on (a, b).
• If λ≪ µ and there exists j ∈ N −{i} such that sj = 1
on (a, b), then gi is strictly decreasing on (a, b).
Proof. Let
qj(d) = µ ((d,R] ∪ {dj ∈ [0, R] : sj(dj) = 0}) .
We will show that qj is constant on (a, b) if sj = 0 on
(a, b). Assume sj = 0 on (a, b) and take any α and β in
(a, b). Without loss of generality, assume that α ≤ β. Then,
qj(α)− qj(β)
= µ ((α, β]− {dj ∈ [0, R] : sj(dj) = 0})
= µ (∅) = 0.
This proves that qj is constant on (a, b) if sj = 0 on (a, b).
Since gi(d) =
Q
j∈N−{i} qj(d), gi also becomes constant on
(a, b) if sj = 0 for all j ∈ N − {i}.
To prove the second claim, assume that sj = 1 on (a, b)
for some j ∈ N − {i}. Then, for any α and β in (a, b) with
α < β, we have
qj(α)− qj(β)
= µ ((α, β]− {dj ∈ [0, R] : sj(dj) = 0})
= µ ((α, β]) > 0,
where the last inequality follows from λ ≪ µ. This proves
that qj is strictly decreasing on (a, b) for at least one j ∈
N −{i}. Since gi(d) =
Q
j∈N−{i} qj(d) and qj(d)’s are non-
increasing with at least one of them strictly decreasing (a, b),
we also have gi(d) is strictly decreasing on (a, b).
Definition 3. The density of µ is its Radon-Nikodym
derivative f with respect to λ.
If f is the density of µ, the following holds for any mea-
surable subset E of [0, R]:
µ(E) =
Z
E
f(x)dλ(x).
Property 4. For any given strategy profile s−i = (sj)j∈N−{i}
of other nodes, gi(d) is a continuous function of d. More-
over, it µ has a bounded density, it is Ho¨lder continuous of
order n− 1.
Proof. Let again
qj(d) = µ ((d,R] ∪ {dj ∈ [0, R] : sj(dj) = 0}) .
For any given δ > 0, choose ǫ > 0 small enough that
µ ((d, d+ ǫ]) is smaller than δ. This is possible since µ≪ λ
(see [6]). Then,
|qj(d)− qj(d+ ǫ)|
= µ ((d, d+ ǫ]− {dj ∈ [0, R] : sj(dj) = 0})
≤ µ ((d, d+ ǫ])
≤ δ.
This proves the continuity of qj(d) as a function of d for all
j ∈ N − {i}. Since gi(d) =
Q
j∈N−{i} qj(d), gi(d) is also
continuous as a function of d.
Now, assume that µ has a bounded density f . Let K =
supx∈[0,R] f(x) <∞. Then,
|qj(d)− qj(d+ ǫ)| ≤ µ ((d, d+ ǫ])
=
Z d+ǫ
d
f(x)dλ(x)
≤ ǫK.
Therefore, |gi(d)− gi(d+ ǫ)| ≤ ǫ
n−1Kn−1.
The packet success probability curves are illustrated more
concretely in following examples where there are two nodes
uniformly distributed over the network domain. In these
examples, we focus on g1(d) and vary the strategy of node
2.
Example 1. Let s2(d) = 1 for d ∈
ˆ
0, R
2
˜
and s2(d) = 0
for d ∈
`
R
2
, R
˜
. Then,
g1(d) = µ
„
(d,R] ∪
„
R
2
, R
–«
=

R2−d2
R2
if 0 ≤ d < R
2
,
3
4
if R
2
≤ d ≤ R
.
Example 2. Let s2(d) = 0 for d ∈
ˆ
0, R
2
´
and s2(d) = 1
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ˆ
R
2
, R
˜
. Then,
g1(d) = µ
„
(d,R] ∪
»
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R
2
««
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1
4
+ R
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2
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3
, 2R
3
´
, and 1 other-
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„
R
3
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3
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3
,
8
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3
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3
,
1
3
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3
≤ d ≤ R
.
Example 4. Let s2(d) = 1 for d ∈
ˆ
R
3
, 2R
3
˜
, and 0 other-
wise. Then,
g1(d) = µ
„
(d,R] ∪
»
0,
R
3
«
∪
„
2R
3
, R
–«
=
8<
:
1 if 0 ≤ d < R
3
,
1
9
+ R
2−d2
R2
if R
3
≤ d < 2R
3
,
2
3
if 2R
3
≤ d ≤ R
.
Node 2 strategies in above examples and the correspond-
ing g1(d) for these examples are shown in Fig. 2 as a function
of d by setting R = 12. The properties of the packet success
probability listed above can be observed more concretely in
this figure.
3.2 Best Response Strategies
We now investigate the behavior of the best-response strat-
egy s∗i of node i given the strategies s−i = (sj)j∈N−{i} of
other nodes. To formally define best-response strategies of
nodes, we let E [ui|T ] (d) be the expected utility of node i
given that it transmits and its distance to the sink node is
equal to d. E [ui|T ] (d) also depends on s−i but we do not
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Figure 2: Change of packet success probability g1(d)
as a function of d when there two nodes uniformly
distributed over the network domain. g1(d) is plotted
for four different strategies of node 2.
show this dependence explicitly to keep the notation as sim-
ple as possible. Then, a selfish node transmits if its expected
utility given that it transmits is greater than zero. On the
other hand, it defers from transmission if its expected utility
given that it transmits is smaller than zero. We break the
ties at 0 by assuming that node i backs off when its expected
utility given that it transmits is equal to zero. We formally
define the best-response strategy of node i as follows.
Definition 4. For a given strategy profile s−i = (sj)j∈N−{i}
of other nodes, let
Bi = {d ∈ [0, R] : E [ui|T ] (d) > 0}.
Then, we call Bi the best-response set of node i given s−i.
The best-response strategy s∗i of node i given s−i is to trans-
mit for all di ∈ Bi, and to back off otherwise.
Definition 5. We say the strategy of node i is a mono-
tonically decreasing strategy if there exists a cut-off point d˜i
such that node i transmits when its distance to the sink is
smaller than d˜i, and backs off when its distance to the sink
is greater than or equal to d˜i. A strategy profile s = (si)i∈N
is a monotonically decreasing strategy profile if si is a mono-
tonically decreasing strategy for all i ∈ N .
E [ui|T ] (d) can be written explicitly as follows:
E [ui|T ] (d) = gi(d)− ci(1− gi(d))
= (1 + ci)gi(d)− ci.
Therefore, the properties proven for gi(d) above continue
to hold for E [ui|T ] (d). In particular, E [ui|T ] (d) is a non-
increasing and continuous function of d by Property 2 and
Property 4. This implies that whenever E [ui|T ] (d
′) > 0 for
some d′ ∈ [0, R], E [ui|T ] (d) > 0 for all d ≤ d
′. Similarly,
whenever E [ui|T ] (d
′) ≤ 0 for some d′ ∈ [0, R], E [ui|T ] (d) ≤
0 for all d ≥ d′.
The above observations enable us to characterize best-
response strategies of nodes by means of least upper bounds
of their best-response sets. In particular, we will show that
for any given strategy profile s−i = (sj)j∈N−{i} of other
nodes, there exists a critical node-sink separation d∗i such
that if node i’s distance to the sink node is smaller than d∗i ,
then node i transmits. Otherwise, it backs off. Moreover,
d∗i is equal to the least upper bound of Bi. Therefore, the
best-response strategy of node i against any s−i is a mono-
tonically decreasing strategy whose cut-off point is equal to
d∗i . These claims are formally stated in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. Let s−i = (sj)j∈N−{i} be a strategy profile
of other nodes, d be the node-sink separation and
d
∗
i = supBi.
Then, the following hold:
• d∗i > 0.
• If E [ui|T ] (R) > 0, then d
∗
i = R and node i transmits
for all d ∈ [0, R].
• If E [ui|T ] (R) = 0 and d
∗
i = R, then node i transmits
for all d ∈ [0, R), and backs off for d = R.
• If d∗i ∈ (0, R), then E [ui|T ] (d
∗
i ) = 0 and node i trans-
mits for all d ∈ [0, d∗i ) and backs off for all d ∈ [d
∗
i , R].
Proof. The first item follows from the continuity of E [ui|T ] (d)
and the fact that E [ui|T ] (0) = 1. Let us focus on the sec-
ond item. If E [ui|T ] (R) > 0, then E [ui|T ] (d) > 0 for all
d ∈ [0, R] since E [ui|T ] (d) is a non-increasing function of d.
This proves the second item.
For the third item, we will show that E [ui|T ] (d) > 0 for
all d ∈ [0, R). Suppose this is not correct. Then, there exists
d′ < R such that E [ui|T ] (d
′) ≤ 0. Since E [ui|T ] (0) = 1, we
have E [ui|T ] (d
′′) = 0 for some d′′ < R by the intermediate
value theorem. Let
d∗ = inf {d ∈ [0, R] : E [ui|T ] (d) = 0} . (3)
d∗ is the first time E [ui|T ] (d) hits 0. Since E [ui|T ] (d) is a
non-increasing continuous function starting at 1 when d = 0
and crossing 0 for some positive d smaller than R, we have
d∗i = d∗ < R, which is a contradiction.
To prove the fourth item, first observe that E [ui|T ] (d) ≤
0 for all d ∈ [d∗i , R] by using the definition of d
∗
i and the
continuity of E [ui|T ] (d). Since E [ui|T ] (0) = 1, there exists
a d′ ≤ d∗i such that E [ui|T ] (d
′) = 0 by the intermediate
value theorem. We define d∗ as in (3). Since E [ui|T ] (d)
is a non-increasing continuous function starting at 1 when
d = 0 and crossing 0 for some positive d, d∗i = d∗. We have
E [ui|T ] (d
∗
i ) = 0 by using d
∗
i = d∗ and the continuity of
E [ui|T ] (d). Observe that E [ui|T ] (d) > 0 for all d ∈ [0, d
∗
i )
since d∗i is the first time that E [ui|T ] (d) hits 0. As a result,
node i transmits for all d ∈ [0, d∗i ), and backs off for all
d ∈ [d∗i , R].
3.3 Properties of Nash Equilibrium Strategy
Profiles
We now focus on Nash equilibria of the random access
game with imperfect location information. We formally de-
fine a Nash equilibrium strategy profile as follows.
Definition 6. A strategy profile s∗ = (s∗i )i∈N is a Nash
equilibrium of the random access game with imperfect loca-
tion information if and only if for all i ∈ N , s∗i is the best-
response strategy of node i given strategies s∗−i = (s
∗
j )j∈N−{i}
of other nodes.
Due to the monotonicity property of best-response strate-
gies proved in Theorem 1, a Nash equilibrium strategy pro-
file becomes a monotonically decreasing strategy profile, and
we can characterize Nash equilibrium strategies by means of
critical node-sink separations. To this end, for any given
Nash equilibrium strategy profile s∗ = (s∗i )i∈N , we let
d
∗
i = supBi. (4)
It follows from Theorem 1 and the definition of Nash equi-
librium that at a Nash equilibrium, node i transmits until
d∗i and backs off after d
∗
i , and this is correct for all i ∈ N .
In the rest of the paper, we will analyze the properties of
critical node-sink separations. The following theorem shows
that there cannot be two different nodes transmitting for all
node-sink separations at a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 2. At a Nash equilibrium, there cannot be two
different nodes i and j in N having d∗i = d
∗
j = R.
Proof. Suppose there are two different nodes i and j in
N having d∗i = d
∗
j = R. Let d be the distance of node i to
the sink node. Then, packets from node i fails if Dj < d.
Therefore, we have the following upper bound on the packet
success probability of node i when its separation from the
sink node is equal to d:
gi(d) ≤ 1− P {Dj < d} .
Thus, gi(d) goes to zero as d increases to R. As a result,
E [ui|T ] (d) = (1 + ci)gi(d)− ci
eventually becomes smaller than 0, and stays below 0 for all
d close enough to R, which contradicts d∗i = R.
In the next theorem, we establish necessary conditions for
nodes’ strategies at Nash equilibria.
Theorem 3. Let s∗ = (s∗i )i∈N be a Nash equilibrium
strategy profile, and {d∗i }i∈N be corresponding critical node-
sink separations at which nodes stop transmitting. Let also
dmax = maxi∈N d
∗
i . Then, the following hold:
• If dmax < R, then gi(d
∗
i ) =
ci
1+ci
for all i ∈ N .
• If dmax = R, then gi(d
∗
i ) =
ci
1+ci
for all i ∈ N −{imax}
and gimax(R) ≥
cimax
1+cimax
, where imax is the index of the
node whose critical threshold is equal to R.
Proof. We first prove the first item. When dmax < R,
all d∗i ’s belong to (0, R). By using Theorem 1, we have
E [ui|T ] (d
∗
i ) = 0 for all i ∈ N . Since E [ui|T ] (d) = (1 +
ci)gi(d)− ci, the proof of the first item is finished.
To prove the second item, we first observe that imax is
well-defined, and there is only one node having its critical
threshold equal to R by Theorem 2. Thus, d∗i < R for all
i ∈ N − {imax}. This further implies that gi(d
∗
i ) =
ci
1+ci
for
all i ∈ N −{imax} by Theorem 1. If a node with index imax
has its critical threshold equal to R, then E [uimax |T ] (R) ≥
0. Otherwise, E [uimax |T ] (d) must hit zero for some d < R,
which contradicts imax having its critical threshold equal
to R. Since E [uimax |T ] (R) ≥ 0, we also have gimax(R) ≥
cimax
1+cimax
.
In the next theorem, we prove the equivalence of best-
response strategies of nodes having the same cost of packet
failures. This will help us to divide nodes into equivalence
classes according to their costs of packet failures.
Theorem 4. At a Nash equilibrium, there cannot be two
different nodes i and j having ci = cj and d
∗
i 6= d
∗
j .
Proof. Suppose s∗ = (s∗i )i∈N is a Nash equilibrium strat-
egy profile, and there are two different nodes i and j having
ci = cj and d
∗
i 6= d
∗
j . Without loss of generality, assume
that d∗i < d
∗
j ≤ R. Then, gi(d) = gj(d) for all d < d
∗
i since
the strategies of other nodes are fixed, and both of nodes i
and j transmit for all d < d∗i . Furthermore, gi(d
∗
i ) = gj(d
∗
i )
by continuity of gi(d) and gj(d). We have gi(d
∗
i ) =
ci
1+ci
by
Theorem 3. Since ci = cj , gi(d
∗
i ) = gj(d
∗
i ) and E [uj |T ] (d) is
a non-increasing function of d, we have E [uj |T ] (d) ≤ 0 for
all d ∈ [d∗i , R], which contradicts d
∗
j being the least upper
bound of node j’s best-response set.
For any given cost vector c = (ci)i∈N , we divide nodes
into equivalence classes as follows. For a given cost value
c˜ > 0, c˜-equivalence class of nodes is equal to
C˜ = {i ∈ N : ci = c˜}.
By Theorem 4, all nodes in C˜ have the same strategies at a
Nash equilibrium. We let N˜ =
n
C˜1, C˜2, · · · , C˜|N˜ |
o
be the set
of non-empty equivalence classes of nodes whose elements
are ordered as
c˜1 > c˜2 > · · · > c˜|N˜ |,
where C˜i = {j ∈ N : cj = c˜i}.
In the next theorem, we will focus on the set of equivalence
classes of nodes, and give a sufficient condition for a Nash
equilibrium to exist.
Theorem 5. Let s = (si)i∈N be a monotonically decreas-
ing strategy profile with cut-off points (d˜i)i∈N , c = (ci)i∈N
be the cost vector of nodes, and N˜ =
n
C˜1, C˜2, · · · , C˜|N˜ |
o
be
the set of corresponding equivalence classes of nodes. As-
sume also that λ≪ µ.
1.
˛˛˛
C˜|N˜ |
˛˛˛
> 1: For all C˜i ∈ N˜ , if there exists d˜
∗
i such that
for all j ∈ C˜i, dj = d˜
∗
i and gj(d˜
∗
i ) =
c˜i
1+c˜i
, then s is a
Nash equilibrium.
2.
˛˛˛
C˜|N˜ |
˛˛˛
= 1: For all C˜i ∈ N˜ , if there exists d˜
∗
i such that
d˜∗
|N˜ |
= R, and for all j ∈ C˜i, 1 ≤ i ≤ |N˜ | − 1, dj = d˜
∗
i
and gj(d˜
∗
i ) =
c˜i
1+c˜i
, then s is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We start the proof with the first item. Assume
that the conditions in the first item hold. We then show
that d˜∗1 < d˜
∗
2 < · · · < d˜
∗
|N˜ |
. To this end, assume there exists
C˜i and C˜k having c˜i > c˜k and d˜
∗
i ≥ d˜
∗
k. Take ji ∈ C˜i and
jk ∈ C˜k. By using the same arguments as in Theorem 4, we
have
gji(d˜
∗
k) = gjk (d˜
∗
k) =
c˜k
1 + c˜k
<
c˜i
1 + c˜i
.
By Property 2, we have gji(d˜
∗
i ) <
c˜i
1+c˜i
, which is a contra-
diction.
Now, assume that there exists a C˜i and a node j ∈ C˜i
such that sj(d) = 1 for all d ∈ [0, d˜
∗
i ), and 0 otherwise is
not the best response of node j given s−j . This implies that
d∗j 6= d˜
∗
i . First consider d
∗
j < d˜
∗
i . By Property 3, gj(·) is a
strictly decreasing function on (d∗j , d˜
∗
i ). Thus, E[uj |T ](d
∗
j ) >
0, which is a contradiction. Now, consider d∗j > d˜
∗
i . If
i = |N˜ |, then E[uj |T ](d) = 0 for all d ≥ d˜
∗
i . This contradicts
d∗j being the least upper bound for Bj . If i < |N˜ |, then
E[uj |T ](d
∗
j ) < 0, which is another contradiction. Thus, d
∗
j =
d˜∗i .
For the second item, we repeat the same arguments for all
i ≤ |N˜ |−1. For the equivalence class C˜|N˜ |, let j be the node
in this class. Then, gj
“
d˜∗
|N˜ |−1
”
=
c˜|N˜ |−1
1+c˜
|N˜ |−1
>
cj
1+cj
. Since
there is no node but node j transmitting when node-sink
separation is greater than d˜∗
|N˜ |−1
, we have E[uj |T ](d) > 0
for all d ∈ [0, R]. Therefore, d∗j = R.
3.4 Example: Uniformly Distributed Nodes Hav-
ing the Same Cost of Packet Failures
To illustrate the use of the above theorems, we will now
calculate the Nash equilibrium of the random access game
with imperfect location information when n nodes are uni-
formly distributed over the network domain. We assume
that all nodes have the same cost of packet failures which is
equal to c > 0. By Theorem 4, all nodes have the same
strategies at Nash equilibrium. Therefore, we focus our
attention on symmetric monotonically decreasing strategy
profiles. Let d∗ be the critical node-sink separation such
that nodes transmit when their distance to the sink node is
smaller than d∗, and back off otherwise. By Theorem 2, we
have d∗ < R. Therefore, by Theorem 3, we must have
gi(d
∗) =
c
1 + c
for all i ∈ N .
Since nodes have symmetric strategies, gi(d) will be the
same for all i ∈ N . Let us consider g1(d). For all d < d
∗,
we have
g1(d) =
 
1−
„
d
R
«2!n−1
.
By Property 4, we also have
g1(d
∗) =
 
1−
„
d∗
R
«2!n−1
. (5)
Therefore,
d
∗ = R ·
s
1−
„
c
1 + c
« 1
n−1
. (6)
In Fig. 3, we show the change of d∗ as a function of c
for R = 12 and for different values of number of nodes.
d∗ decreases as c increases since nodes are deterred from
transmission due to the increasing cost of packet failures. d∗
also decreases as n increases due to the increasing number
of nodes competing for communicating with the sink node.
4. EXTENSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The current work suggests two interesting future research
directions. The first one is to analyze ad-hoc networks in
which there are many transmitter-receiver pairs. The be-
havior of selfish transmitters in this paper has been analyzed
only for a many-to-one communication scenario where there
are many transmitter nodes wishing to communicate with a
common sink node. However, the set-up of the problem can
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Figure 3: Change of critical node-sink separation d∗
at which nodes stop transmitting as a function of
the cost of packet failures c. (R = 12)
be easily generalized to the communication scenario where
there are many one-to-one communication links.
To this end, consider a wireless ad-hoc network in which
there are n transmitter-receiver pairs. The distance between
the ith pair is represented by Di, where Di is a random
variable whose distribution is known by other nodes but its
exact value is not known. The transmitter and the receiver
of the ith pair can be thought as if they are joined together
by a stick of length Di, and then thrown over the network
domain by preserving Di. The center of the stick joining
the ith pair is distributed over the network domain accord-
ing to a known spatial point process. Then, the ith pair
communicates successfully if there is no transmitting node
inside the disc of radius Di centered at the receiver of this
pair, which is closely related to the problem analyzed in
this paper. Therefore, a similar analysis reveals the Nash
equilibrium strategy profiles for nodes in this more ad-hoc
setting.
The second extension is to consider more general wireless
channel models. In this work, we have considered only the
wireless channel model in which the signal with the highest
received power can be captured successfully. However, the
same analysis can be repeated for more general multi-packet
reception channel matrices where it is possible to simulta-
neously receive more than one packet successfully.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have analyzed the behavior of selfish
transmitters under imperfect location information. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first work analyzing wire-
less networks containing selfish nodes under imperfect loca-
tion information. The current work also opens some inter-
esting future research directions, and provides insights into
how to analyze multi-hop wireless ad hoc networks consist-
ing of selfish nodes with multi-packet reception capabilities.
Our results can be summarized as follows. We first ob-
tained the properties of packet success probability as a func-
tion of node-sink separation for arbitrary strategy profiles.
We then characterized the behavior of best-response strate-
gies of nodes against arbitrary opponent strategy profiles.
In particular, we proved that the best-response strategy of
a node against any arbitrary opponent strategy profile is a
monotonically decreasing strategy in which the node trans-
mits until a critical node-sink separation, and then stops
transmitting. By using these results, we finally gave nec-
essary and sufficient conditions for a strategy profile to be
Nash equilibrium.
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